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LABOR LAW-The Judicial Role in the Enforcement
of the "Excelsior Rule"
In 1966 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) promulgated the "Excelsior rule," which requires employers to produce lists
of their employees' names and addresses for use by unions during
representation election campaigns.1 There is little doubt that this
rule is a permissible exercise of the NLRB's authority to control
I. Within seven days after the filing of a consent election agreement, the employer
must file with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) a list of the names and
addresses of all employees eligible to vote in the representation election. This list
is then made available to union organizers for the express purpose of insuring that
they possess sufficient information to allow them to inform every employee of the
advantages to be gained by voting for the union in the upcoming representation
election. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). See Lewis, NLRB Intrudes on the Right of Privacy, 17 LAB. L.J. 280 (1966); Comment, Dilemma in Labor
Law: The Right To Own Versus the Right To Know, 5 DUQUESNE L. REv. 77 (1966);
Recent Decision, Labor Law-Labor Management Relations-Representation Elections
-In Future Representation Elections Employer's Failure To Provide Names and Ad·
dresses of Eligible Voters Shall Be Grounds for Setting Aside Election, 54 GEo. L.J, 1434
(1966); Recent Case, Labor Law-Elections-Failure of Employer To Disclose Names
and Addresses of Employees After Election Is Directed Is Ground for Setting Election
Aside, 80 HARV. L. REv. 459 (1966); Case Note, Labor in Light of Mandatory Disclosure
of Employee Names and Addresses the NLRB Defers Reconsideration of Board Policy
in the Area of Plant Access, 17 SYRACUSE L. REv. 762 (1966); Recent Case, Labor Law
-In Future NLRB Elections, Employer M1tst Furnish List of Employees' Names and
Addresses, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1395 (1966).
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representation election proceedings,2 and voluntary compliance has
generally been high; however, recalcitrant employers have created
enforcement problems which the NLRB has been unable to handle
through its usual procedures.
The Excelsior rule is the NLRB's first attempt to impose upon
employers a duty to perform an affirmative act as a prerequisite to a
valid representation election without at the same time making
failure to perform that act an unfair labor practice.3 Of course, an
unfair labor practice may be remedied by a cease and desist order
which can eventually be enforced in the courts if necessary. However, an election campaign rule generally may be enforced only by
2. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended the NLRB to have broad
discretion in controlling the certification process, since no direct appeal was provided
from an NLRB ruling dealing with certification. Evidently, the certification of a
collective bargaining agent was considered only incidental to the primary purpose of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), that actual collective bargaining take place.
s. COMM. ON Eouc. AND LABOR, s. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935); 79 CONG.
REc. 7658 (1935). See also AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 308 U.S. 413 (1940). Thus, the NLRB not only has broad discretion to
certify a collective bargaining agent, but also can apply the rules and procedures that
it feels are necessary to insure a "fair" representation election without being subject
to direct court review. See, e.g., NLRB v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940)
("The control of the election proceeding and the determination of the steps necessary
to conduct that election fairly were matters which Congress entrusted to the Board
alone. Interference in those matters by the court constituted error on the part of the
court below''); NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 224 F.2d 649, 651 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955) ("Whether a representation election has been conducted
under conditions compatible with the exercise of a free choice by the employees, is a
matter which Congress has committed to the discretion of the Board.''); Foreman &:
Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887 (1954) (twentyfour hour rule held proper). Normally, the only method by which an employer may
procure court review of NLRB election rulings is to refuse to bargain with the certified
union in violation of § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). The employer may
then allege the illegality of the election as a defense in a court proceeding instituted
by the NLRB seeking an order to bargain. However, the employer may obtain direct
review of an NLRB ruling in a representation proceeding if the NLRB acted in
excess of its delegated authority contrary to a specific prohibition of the NLRA, or
if there is a substantial showing that the NLRB's action has violated a constitutional
right of a party to the proceeding. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Firestone
Tire &: Rubber Co. v. Sarnoff, 365 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1966); Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1965); Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253 F. Supp. 391 (D.D.C.
1966); Note, Judicial Review of Preliminary Orders of National Labor Administrative
Agencies After Leedom v. Kyne, 8 BUFFALO L. REv. 372 (1959); Recent Development,
Labor Law: Judicial Review of NLRB Election Orders, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 1546 (1966).
These exceptions to the general rule have been very narrowly construed.
3. In the past, whenever the NLRB has desired to require affirmative action by an
employer during an election campaign, it has made the employer's failure to perform
the act an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(l) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l)
(1964). For example, if there are no alternative means of communication available to
a union, the NLRB will order the employer to allow the union access to his property
in order to contact employees. Upon finding that the employer's conduct "restrains"
or "coerces" the employees' exercise of their right of self-organization, the NLRB is
empowered to issue a cease and desist order, which may be judicially enforced if the
employer refuses to perform the required conduct. For a discussion of the possibility
of finding noncompliance with the Excelsior rule a violation of § 8(a)(l) of the NLRA,
see text accompanying notes 23-30 infra.
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the NLRB's power to set aside an election and order a new one. In
situations involving the Excelsior rule, the normal method of seeking adherence to election regulations has proved wholly ineffective
when the employer is adamant in his refusal to produce the names
and addresses of his employees.4 Consequently, by administering the
Excelsior rule as a pre-election rule, the NLRB has for the first time
been forced to seek direct judicial assistance in the enforcement of
its campaign regulations. 5
The NLRB has sought such judicial assistance in almost a dozen
cases, and in most of these the courts have assumed an active role in
the enforcement of the Excelsior rule. 6 However, a few courts have
not been receptive to such enforcement,7 and the NLRB itself has
experienced some difficulty in settling upon the proper grounds for
requesting judicial aid. To date, the NLRB has advanced two
theories as bases for court enforcement of the requirement that
employers produce Excelsior lists: (I) it has sought-under section
1337 of the Judicial Code-to invoke the general jurisdiction of
federal district courts to issue injunctions compelling employer compliance;8 (2) it has attempted to subpoena employee lists as "evidence" under section 11(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 9 and to secure court enforcement of such subpoenas under
4. For a discussion of the inadequacy of the NLRB's usual procedure, see text accompanying notes 20-22 infra.
5. Until the promulgation of the Excelsior rule, the NLRB had always sought to
keep judicial interference with its campaign regulations at a minimum. See, e.g., Leedom
v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). See also authorities cited in note 2 supra. Of course, the
NLRB's interest in keeping judicial interference at a minimum does not extend to
situations in which the NLRB has found that a party's conduct constitutes an
unfair labor practice. A party aggrieved by a final order of the NLRB in an unfair labor
practice hearing has a statutory right to judicial review in an appropriate United
States court of appeals. NLRA § lO(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(£) (1964). This right of review
exists even though the finding of unfair labor practice was made in connection with
a representation proceeding.
6. The Excelsior rule has been enforced in the following cases: NLRB v. Hanes
Hosiery Div., Hanes Corp., 384 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d 52
(7th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Wolverine Indus. Div., 64 L.R.R.M. 2187 (S.D. Mich. Jan. 12,
1967); NLRB v. British Auto Parts, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 368 (C.D. Cal. 1967); NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 270 F. Supp. 280 (D. Mass. 1967): Swift & Co. v. Solien, 274 F.
Supp. 953 (E.D. Mo. 1967); NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); NLRB v. Teledyne, Inc., 56 CCH LAB. ,I 12,229 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
11, 1967). Enforcement has been denied in the following cases: NLRB v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 64 L.R.R.M. 2061 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 1966); NLRB v. Q·T Shoe Mfg. Co.,
67 L.R.R.M. 2356 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 1968).
7. See, e.g., NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 67 L.R.R.M. 2356 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 1968).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964) states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."
9. 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1964), which states in part:
The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all reasonable
times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy any
evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to any
matter under investigation or in question. The Board, or any member thereof,
shall upon application of any party to such proceedings, forthwith issue such
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the procedure in section 11(2).10 This Note will examine these
theories and the initial reception given them by the courts.
Before analyzing the propriety and desirability of making judicial enforcement of the Excelsior rule available to the NLRB, it is
necessary to examine the purpose of the rule and the reasons for the
inadequacy of the NLRB's regular enforcement procedures. A
primary goal of all NLRB election rules is to assure that employees
can effectively exercise their right of self-organization under section
7 of the NLRA11 by giving them adequate opportunity to hear both
sides of the issues presented in a representation election campaign.
In attempting to achieve this goal, the NLRB has had to balance
the employees' right to organize against employers' right to control
access to, and utilization of, their business property.12 Since the job
site is usually the most effective forum for employee contact and
discussion, an employer's right to control the use of his property
clearly carries with it an inherent advantage in a representation
election.13 Job site control not only allows an employer to restrict
party subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence in such proceeding or investigation requested in such
application. [Emphasis added.]
IO. 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1964) states:
In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to any person, any district
court of the United States or the United States Courts of any Territory or possession, within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or
resides or transacts business, upon application by the Board shall have jurisdiction
to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Board,
its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to
give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any
failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.
It is generally assumed, on the basis of dictum in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894),
that a federal agency could not itself constitutionally exercise contempt power. Hence,
to secure a contempt sanction to compel obedience to its subpoena, the NLRB must
obtain an enforcement order from an appropriate court. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw § 3.11, at 213 (1958); Note, Use of Contempt Power To Enforce Subpoenas and
Orders of Administrative Agencies, 71 HARv. L. REY. 1541, 1547 (1958).
11. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), states in pertinent part: "Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining •••."
12. Because of the rather sharply defined interests of both employer and union,
the NLRB has been able to adopt fairly specific rules to be applied in common,
recurring situations. For example, prohibitions of nonemployee union organizers from
entering the employer's property is allowed if the union has reasonable alternative
means of communication. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). Similarly,
union solicitation by employees may be prohibited during working hours to maintain
discipline and production, Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943). However,
the employees usually must be allowed to solicit on behalf of the union during such
nonworking time, since the considerations of maintaining production and discipline
are not often present. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
13. The advantages of job site contact are generally conceded; see Note, Labor Law
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union organizational activity on the premises,14 but also guarantees
that the employer will have maximum opportunity to convey his
own antiunion propaganda to his employees. 15 In Excelsior, the
NLRB pointed out these inherent advantages and indicated that
past decisions had resulted in an imbalance between employer and
employee rights, forcing many employees to decide the important
issue of representation with inadequate knowledge of the arguments
in favor of the union position.16 Therefore, in an attempt to narrow
this information gap, the NLRB formulated the Excelsior rule. The
rationale was that requiring the employer to provide the union with
a list of employees' names and addresses would give the union an
opportunity to contact each employee and thus "maximize the likelihood that all voters will be exposed to the arguments for, as well as
against, union representation." 17 To assure this result, the NLRB
also specified that the rule should be applied on a per se basis.18 Such
mechanical application of the Excelsior rule not only avoids the
administrative burden of determining whether existing channels of
communication available to the union are in fact sufficient19 on a
case-by-case basis-which was the situation prior to Excelsior-but
also prevents employers from challenging application of the rule in
-NLRB Regulation of Employer's Pre-Election Captive Audience Speeches, 65 MICH.
L. R.Ev. 1236, 1245 (1967). See generally Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 412
(1953) (dissenting opinion).
14. See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 38 (1964); Note,
Limitations on Employer Conduct During Union Organizational Campaigns-A Survey,
19 VAND. L. R.Ev. 438 (1966); Note, National Labor Relations Act Elections: Post Election Objections, 38 TEMPLE L.Q. 288 (1965).
15. In NLRB v. United Steel Workers (NuTone) 357 U.S. 357 (1958) the Supreme
Court held that an employer may communicate his antiunion views to his employees
at the job site by means of methods such as handbilling and "captive audience" speeches
(addressing employee assemblies at the plant during working time), and still enforce
a valid rule prohibiting the same action by the union.
16. The NLRB held that lack of information prevented the employees from exercising a "free and reasoned choice," and that, consequently, a representation election
conducted under such conditions was unable to fulfill the requirements of the NLRA.
Thus, failure of the employer to abide by the Excelsior rule would be grounds for
setting aside the election. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240-42 (1966).
17. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1241.
18. That this was the intent of the NLRB is clear from the language in Excelsior
holding the rule applicable to "all election cases." 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239. See also
Recent Decision, supra note I, at 1438; Recent Case, Labor Law-Elections-Failure
of Employer To Disclose Names and Addresses of Employees After Election is Directed
Is Grounds for Setting Election Aside, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 459, 461 (1966). The NLRB
has in fact applied the rule on a per se basis, without regard to union need for the
list or good faith substitute efforts made by the employer. See, e.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward 8e Co., 64 L.R.R.M. 2061 (1966); Union Bleachery, 63 L.R.R.M. 1208
(Oct. 4, 1966) (decision of Regional Director R. Johnston). Apparently the only excep•
tion to the rule is the situation in which an expedited election is directed punmant to
§ 8(b)(7)(C) of the NLRA. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1242 n.14 (1966).
19. See Recent Case, note 18 supra, at 461.
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each case, either because they feel they may win on the merits in a
full NLRB hearing or simply because the challenge provides an
opportunity for delay.
Since the Excelsior rule tends to negate the inherent advantages
of job site control, employers may tend to be uncooperative about
producing employee lists in situations involving close election campaigns. Ordinarily, if the NLRB detects conduct which upsets the
"laboratory conditions" necessary for a meaningful representation
election, it will respond by invalidating the "tainted" election and
ordering a new one.20 This procedure attempts to remedy the wrongful conduct by allowing any effects of that conduct to dissipate before
the new election is held; theoretically, the "laboratory conditions"
are restored and a fair election results. However, if an employer
refuses to produce an Excelsior list, the effects of that refusal cannot
be dissipated: the employer can continue to refuse to produce the
list in every subsequent election. In such a case, the NLRB's power
to set aside the election is of little consequence in attempting to
achieve employer compliance with the rule.21 An employer who
20. NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 22·1 F.2d 649 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 914 (1955). See also authorities cited in note 2 supra. The NLRB's general
policy of invalidating elections even though no unfair labor practices were committed
was first adopted in General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948) [quoting in part
from P.D. Gawaltney, 74 N.L.R.B. 371, 373 (1947)]:
"'When we are asked to invalidate elections held under our auspices, our only
consideration derives from the Act which calls for freedom of choice by employees
as to a collective bargaining representative." Conduct that creates an atmosphere
which renders improbable a free choice will sometimes warrant invalidating an
election, even though that conduct may not constitute an unfair labor practice.
An election can serve its true purpose only if the surrounding conditions enable
emplo}'ees ~o register a free and untrammeled choice for or against a bargaining
representauve.
See generally Note, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in
Representation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1246-57 (1963).
Pursuant to its discretion to set aside tainted elections, the NLRB has promulgated
various rules to regulate the election process without making violation of these rules
an unfair labor practice. Thus, for example, in Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427
(1953), the NLRB formulated a rule which forbids "captive audience" speeches within
twenty-four hours before the scheduled time of conducting an election, since such
employer conduct, although not an unfair labor practice, prevents the employees from
making a reasoned choice and hence desu·oys the necessary "laboratory" conditions.
In Dal-Tex Optical Co., Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962), the NLRB made it clear that
conduct violative of § 8(a)(l) of the NLRA and hence an unfair labor practice is, a
fortiori, conduct which invalidates an election since "the test of conduct which may
interfere with the 'laboratory conditions' for an election is considerably more restrictive than the test of conduct which amounts to interference, restraint, or coercion
which violates Section 8(a)(I)." 137 N.L.R.B. at 1786-87.
21. However, ordering a new election does appear to be an adequate sanction to
force compliance with the "twenty-four hour rule" announced in Peerless Plywood Co.,
107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). See note 20 supra. This contrast perhaps may be explained
by the obvious differences between the twenty-four hour rule and the Excelsior rule.
'Whereas the twenty-four hour rule is a prohibition which merely restrains an employer
from committing a certain act (holding a captive audience speech within twenty-four
hours of an election), the Excelsior rule not only requires an affirmative action, but also
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believes that furnishing a list of his employees' names and addresses
will allow a union to win an election it might otherwise lose would
be unlikely to produce the list simply because of the "threat" that
the election might be set aside. If the union should win the election,
his refusal has cost him nothing. However, if the union should be
defeated, the worst that can happen to the employer is that the
NLRB will order a new election in which he can again refuse to
surrender the list. This process may be repeated until either the
NLRB or the employer abandons its position, or until the union
wins an election.22
Since the NLRB's normal election rule enforcement procedures are so ineffective in this situation, it might be asked why the
NLRB has not found an employer's refusal to comply with the
Excelsior rule to be an unfair labor practice under section S(a)(l) of
the NLRA.23 If the NLRB determines that a particular type of conduct interferes with, restrains, or coerces an employee in the
exercise of his right to join a union, it may classify that conduct as
an unfair labor practice and issue a remedial cease and desist order.
If an employer refuses to comply with the order and continues the
practice, the NLRA provides that the NLRB may seek court enforcement of its order.24 Although it may be argued that such a remedy is
adaptable to the Excelsior situation, there are several aspects of the
unfair labor practice procedure which render it undesirable as a
method of enforcing the Excelsior rule. First, under the traditional
unfair labor practice tests, before an employer's refusal to grant
access to his employees may be deemed a section S(a)(l) violation,
the NLRB may be required to show that alternative means of communication were not available to the union. 25 Thus, it is conceivable
that the NLRB would have to make this same preliminary showing
in every Excelsior list case.26 This requirement redefines the scope
confers obvious organizational benefits on the union. Since the twenty-four hour rule
prohibits only captive audience speaking, there would seem to be little impetus to
violate the rule and be assured that the election will be set aside where other effective
means of communication are still open to the employer.
22. In practically all of the reported cases, the union participated in at least one
election without benefit of the list. However, it usually refused to proceed in the
second election on the ground that it had a right to the Excelsior list, and the NLRB
then sought judicial aid in enforcing the rule. See, e.g., NLRB v. British Auto Parts,
Inc., 266 F. Supp. 368 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1964).
24. NLRA § IO(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
25. See note 12 supra.
26. In Excelsior, the NLRB distinguished precedent of this type in order to enable
it to formulate a per se rule. It pointed out first that those decisions concerned unfair
labor practice charges instead of the issue of whether an election should be invalidated,
and secondly that the proof principle was apposite only when the opportunity to communicate made available by the NLRB interfered with a significant employer interest.
Since neither of these two elements was present when enforcing the Excelsior rule, it
could be enforced on a per se basis. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1245
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of the Excelsior rule, which was merely intended to insure that
representation elections be conducted under conditions allowing a
"free and reasoned choice" by the employees.27 Second, it is well
established that the "laboratory conditions" necessary for the exercise of this free choice may be destroyed by conduct which does not
constitute "interference," "restraint," or "coercion" within the terms
of section S(a)(l).28 Therefore, in proving a violation of section
8(a)(l), the NLRB would have to show "interference," "restraint,"
or "coercion" as an effect of the employer's refusal to supply the list,
even though such proof is not necessary to establish that his conduct
has upset the conditions needed for a valid election. Such a proof
requirement would be a significant administrative burden and
would of course destroy per se application of the rule. Even if additional proof were not required, the NLRB still would have to face
the Supreme Court's generally unfavorable attitude toward NLRB
attempts to predicate unfair labor practice charges upon per se application of mechanical rules. 29 Furthermore, assuming that the
Court would permit a per se application of the Excelsior rule as an
unfair labor practice, the amount of time spent going through standard NLRB and court procedures to obtain enforcement would
subvert the congressional purpose to settle the initial question of
union certification as quickly as possible.30
Since the unfair labor practice route seems undesirable when
viewed in the context of the scope and purpose of the Excelsior rule,
the NLRB has advanced the two theories mentioned at the beginning of this Note to secure the desired judicial enforcement. One
approach, as will be recalled, is to sue in federal district court for
an injunction compelling the employer to produce a list of his
employees' names and addresses, predicating jurisdiction on section
1337 of the Judicial Code, which gives district courts jurisdiction
over "any civil action or proceeding arising under an Act of Congress regulating commerce ...." 31 It is clear that an NLRB request
for an injunction to enforce the Excelsior rule fits this statutory
definition; 82 yet, there is uncertainty about whether federal courts
(1966). Whether a per se application could be justified on the second ground alone
(lack of infringement of a significant employer interest) if violation of the Excelsior
rule were made an unfair labor practice has not been decided by the courts or the
NLRB.
27. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1240-41.
28. See note 20 supra.
29. See Note, supra note 13, at 1243-44.
30. s. REP. No. 573, CoMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 14 (1935).
See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 191-93 (1958) (dissenting opinion); NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec, Workers, 308 U.S. 413 (1940); AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1939).
31, 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964). See note 8 supra.
32. Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954); Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 67 L.R.R.M.
2356 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 1968).
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are impliedly precluded from taking jurisdiction under this general
statute to enforce an NLRB order, since Congress has provided
specific procedures in the NLRA for enforcement of NLRB orders.
Several courts have indicated that such an exercise of jurisdiction
may be appropriate,33 but the only court actually to consider this
question emphatically refused to take jurisdiction. In NLRB v.
Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co.,34 the federal district court for New Jersey
reasoned that since the NLRA specifically authorizes federal courts
to enforce NLRA orders only if they are predicated on a finding of
an unfair labor practice, courts are impliedly precluded from taking
jurisdiction in other situations. The court·indicated that this conclusion is especially true when the NLRB seeks enforcement of an
election rule, as in Excelsior, since the control of elections is thought
to reside in the NLRB alone. 35 The court concluded that "enforcement of the Excelsior rule can only occur after it has been properly
determined by the Board that the refusal by the defendant to provide the Union with a list of its employees' names and addresses
constitutes an unfair labor practice under Section S(a)(l) ...." 36
Q-T Shoe is subject to criticism because it ignores a body of
authority developed in analogous situations which indicates that the
mere failure of Congress to grant specific authority to seek certain
judicial relief does not necessarily preclude an administrative agency
from petitioning for such relief. 37 In fact, the NLRB itself has been
permitted to seek an injunction in federal court to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction under the NLRA despite the absence of express
statutory authorization to procure such relief. In NLRB v. New York
State Labor Relations Board,38 the NLRB sought to enjoin a state
labor board from asserting jurisdiction over a dispute which had been
33. NLRB v. Wolverine Indus., 64 L.R.R.M., 2187 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 12, 1967); NLRB
v. British Auto Parts, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 368 (C.D. Cal. 1967): Swift &: Co. v. Solien, 274
F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Mo. 1967). None of these courts considered the questions raised by
this mode of enforcement.
34. 67 L.R.R.M. 2356 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 1968).
35. 67 L.R.R.M. at 2361. See also note 2 supra; NLRB v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 309
U.S. 206; Foreman &: Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 346 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 887 (1954); NLRB v. Ideal Laundry&: Dry Cleaning Co., 372 F.2d 307 (10th Cir,
1967).
36. 67 L.R.R.M. at 2361.
37. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Atlantic &: Gulf Panama Canal Zone,
241 F. Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("[T)here is ample authority that mere failure
of Congress to grant specific authorization to seek injunctive relief docs not manifest an
intent thereby to preclude resort to that remedy."); NLRB v. New York State Labor
Rel. Bd., 106 F. Supp. 749, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (In answer to defendant's contention that
the NLRB had no authority to bring an action not expressly authorized by the NLRA,
the court stated: "The power of an administrative agency to bring actions may be implied. . . . The court is of the opinion that the National Board has implied authority to bring this action [seeking to enjoin the state Board's proceedings] to protect
its exclusive jurisdiction."); NLRB v. Killoren, 122 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1941); NLRB v.
Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1942) ..
38. 106 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See also NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125
F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1942).
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made the subject of an unfair labor practice charge pending before
the NLRB. The state labor board argued that Congress had impliedly precluded the NLRB from seeking this particular type of injunction by specifying in the NLRA two situations where such
injunctions were appropriate. 39 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument and held that the NLRB's authority
to seek an injunction to protect its jurisdiction could be implied in
this case. Similarly, the fact that Congress has provided the unfair
labor practice route as one method of enforcing NLRB orders should
not preclude the use of other convenient means of obtaining enforcement. Thus, although the NLRB could enforce the Excelsior election campaign rule in accordance with the statutory unfair labor
practice procedures, it should not be restricted to this method of enforcement.40
Moreover, the reasoning in Q-T Shoe that only unfair labor
practice orders can be enforced in court does not take cognizance of
the NLRB's established functions under the NLRA. The legislative
history indicates that Congress intended to grant broad powers to the
NLRB to determine questions of representation, and the courts have
consistently recognized that the NLRB has a wide degree of discretion in controlling representation proceedings.41 In exercising this
discretion, it is clear that the NLRB may find a representation
election invalid without finding that an unfair labor practice has
been committed.42 If the NLRB can overturn an election tainted by
conduct which is not an unfair labor practice, it would seem, as a
policy matter, that it should also have the right to enforce a rule
which prevents such conduct before an election, and to obtain judicial assistance in that enforcement if necessary.
Assuming that a section 1337 injunction is a proper method of
enforcing the Excelsior rule, it would appear that the NLRB could
avoid the disadvantages inherent in the unfair labor practice route
to enforcement-the time consumed and the additional proof required.43 Despite this advantage, however, the equitable nature of
39. 29 u.s.c. §§ 160(j), (l) (1964).
40. The court in NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 67 L.R.R.M. 2356 (D.N.J. Jan. 19,
1968), unlike the court in NLRB v. New York State Labor Rel. Bd., 106 F. Supp. 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), did not phrase the question of whether an injunction could be granted
to enforce the Excelsior rule in terms of the fact that the NLRA specified that injunctions could be sought only in certain situations. Rather, the Q-T Shoe court viewed the
injunction as another method of enforcing "Board orders." 67 L.R.R.M. at 2359-61.
41. See note 2 supra.
42. See note 20 supra.
43. Issuance of a section 1337 injunction turns on whether it is reasonably necessary
to aid the NLRB in the administration of its statutory duty. Walling v. Brooklyn
Braid Co., Inc., 152 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1945). Since the Excelsior rule was designed
to aid the NLRB in conducting representation proceedings, the only proof needed is
substantiation of the NLRB's contention that a valid election could not be held without
union possession of the Excelsior list. For a discussion of the different proof needed in
the unfair labor practice mode of enforcement, see text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
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the judicial relief sought may render the section 1337 mode of en•
forcement undesirable in an Excelsior situation. A district court is
free under section 1337 to determine whether the injunction is
"reasonably necessary" to aid in the administration of the agency's
statutory duty; thus, per se application of the rule could again be
thwarted. Although a court's inquiry into this question would probably be somewhat limited out of deference to the NLRB's acknowledged discretion to control representation elections, a court could
easily hold that the facts of a given case do not establish a sufficient
need for the name and address list.44 Given the possibility that a
court may attempt an independent evaluation of the applicability of
Excelsior rule in a particular case, recalcitrant employers may
choose to disregard the NLRB's order in hopes of winning in court.
Because of these legal and practical difficulties, the NLRB has
generally relied on the second theory mentioned above: judicial
enforcement of the Excelsior rule through the NLRA's subpoena
procedure. The NLRB's preference for this method is readily under•
standable. Once a court has determined that issuance of the subpoena is within the NLRB's statutory authority its discretion in
passing upon the enforceability of the subpoena is limited.45 Unless the material sought is plainly incompetent or irrelevant to
any lawful purpose of the agency seeking disclosure, the subpoena
will be enforced.46 A party opposing enforcement may not raise
defenses related to the merits of the administrative proceeding,4'1'
although he may assert that enforcement of the subpoena will
violate his constitutional rights48 or place an oppressive burden upon
44. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward &: Co., 64 L.R.R.M. 2061 (M.D. Fla. 1966), in
which the court felt that since the union already knew the names and addresses of
sixty-four of the seventy employees eligible to vote in the election there was no need
to resort to the court's equity power.
45. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 10, at § 3.12 (1958); Cooper, Federal Agency
Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60 MrcH. L. REv. 187
(1961); Note, Use of Contempt To Enforce Subpoenas and Orders of Administrative
Agendes, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1541 (1958); Note, Resisting Enforcement of Administrative
Subpoenas Duces Tecum: Another Look at CAB v. Hermann, 69 YALE L.J. 131 (1959).
46. 0. T. Link v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1964) (NLRB's subpoena power
limited only by the requirement that the information sought must be relevant to the
inquiry); NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 200 F. Supp. 48 (D. Conn. 1961), aff'd mem.,
300 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1962) (only limit on NLRB's subpoena power is that it may not
exceed the NLRB's statutory authority and the information sought may not be so
irrelevant as to make the subpoena arbitrary. See also Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1942); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1946). But cf. Goodyear Tire&: Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 122 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 1941)
(enforcement of the subpoena remains within the complete discretion of the district
court).
47. NLRB v. C.C.C. Associates, Inc., 306 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1962).
48. See, e.g., FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965) (right of privacy); Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (right against self-incrimination); Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (unlawful search and seizure).
Employers have attempted various attacks on the validity of the Excelsior rule
itself and on the burden caused by supplying the names and addresses in individual
cases. However, in recognition of the broad power granted the NLRB in regulating

April 1968]

Notes

1303

him.40 Therefore, if the subpoena is within the NLRB's statutory
authority, and if it appears on the face of the subpoena that the
material sought is relevant, the enforcement proceeding should be
summary in nature; this factor makes the subpoena enforcement
technique well suited for per se application of the Excelsior rule.
It is unclear, however, whether Congress has delegated sufficient
authority to the NLRB to enable it to subpoena a list of employees'
names and addresses for the express purpose of making the information available to the union. The answer to this question turns upon
construction of section 11(1) of the NLRA, which grants the NLRB
power to subpoena "evidence" relating to "any matter under investigation or in question." 50 "Evidence" has normally been defined as
any material which "tends to prove or disprove the existence of
something." 51 One court has suggested that an employee group
representation proceedings, the courts have rather summarily dismissed these arguments.
Attacks on the validity of the Excelsior rule are most frequently based on the
argument that disclosure of the names and addresses infringes the employees' constitutional right of privacy and their right under section 7 of the NLRA not to engage in
union activity. Apart from the question of whether the employer has standing to raise
these defenses, the courts have dismissed the first contention on the ground that the list
merely provides a means by which the union may attempt to communicate with the
employees and in no way impairs the employees' right to disregard these attempts. But
cf. Lewis, NLRB Intrudes on the Right of Privacy, 17 LAB. L.J. 280 (1966). Similarly,
the second contention has been dismissed on the grounds that expression of the
employee's section 7 right to engage in or abstain from union activity will take place
upon the casting of his ballot for or against union representation, and obtaining
information can hardly be considered engaging in union activity.
A more imaginative contention has been that requiring the employer to provide
material which will eventually be used by the union to further its organizational efforts
is forcing the employer to violate the NLRA. Section 302(a) of the NLRA does make
it a crime for an employer to deliver a "thing of value" to anyone seeking to represent
his employees, but, as indicated by the one court which has considered this question, it
may safely be assumed that Congress in providing this section did not intend to cover
the situation where the NLRB has determined that production of a "thing of value"
is necessary to effectuate its policy.
Probably the most serious argument that has been advanced by an employer is
that it is operating in a "tight" labor market and disclosure of its employees' names and
addresses will result in pirating of valuable employees by its competitors. The courts
have generally dismissed this argument by pointing to the fact that the NLRB will
make the information available only to the unions involved in the representation
election, thus making it unlikely that a rival employer will ever obtain the information. Moreover, no employer has shown that if the names and addresses did leak out the
possibility of "pirating" would be more than mere speculation. In addition to these
proof difficulties, the employer would also encounter formidable obstacles in attempting to show that his interest in maintaining his work force intact outweighs the public
interest in seeing the policies of the NLRA effectuated through disclosure of the list.
However, the possible merit of this defense in exceptional circumstances indicates that
it should not be precluded in all cases, and the courts' history of strict scrutiny of
similar defenses suggests that recognition of such an exception would not be a threat
to the NLRB's attempt to apply the rule on a per se basis.
49. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
50. NLRA § 11(1), 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1964) (quoted more fully in note 9 supra).
See also NLRA § 11(2), 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1964). Quoted at note IO supra.
51. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 270 F. Supp. 280, 284 (D. Mass. 1967).
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preference is "something in issue" which must be proved or disproved in a representation election proceeding. 52 Since the union's
use of the Excelsior list to disseminate campaign propaganda helps
to provide a more fully informed electorate, which in turn helps
to reflect accurately employee group preference, the NLRB is
arguably using the subpoenaed material to prove or disprove
"something in issue." The weakness of this rationale would seem
to be that a name and address list has no value in and of itself
in proving employee preference while it is in the NLRB's hands. It
is only the subsequent use of the list by the union to contact employees, and the employees' reaction to the union's arguments, which
provides an indication of group preference. Therefore, an Excelsior
list can hardly be considered "evidence" in the traditional sense of
the word.
Perhaps recognizing that the traditional definition is inapplicable, several courts have enforced Excelsior list subpoenas by expanding the definition of "evidence" to include any information
necessary or helpful to the NLRB in carrying out its statutory
duties. 53 Since an Excelsior list assists the NLRB in performing its
duty of conducting meaningful representation elections, these courts
have concluded that subpoenas of the lists are enforceable. Conceding that the broader definition of "evidence" permits enforcement,
it is questionable whether the courts engaged in the redefinition
have precedent for their actions. These courts have generally relied
upon several older cases in which subpoenas for similar material
were enforced.54 However, a review of these past cases indicates that
the material subpoenaed was in each case evidence even under the
traditional definition; therefore, these cases do not support the broad
proposition for which they are presently being cited.55 Nevertheless,
52. NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1967).
53. See, e.g., NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1967):
NLRB v. British Auto Parts, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 368 (C.D. Cal. 1967); NLRB v. Hanes
Hosiery Div., Hanes Corp., 384 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Teledyne, Inc., 4
CCH Lab. Cas. 20,071 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1967); NLRB v. Wolverine Indus. Div.,
64 L.R.R.M. 2187 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 12, 1967); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 270 F.
Supp. 280 (D. Mass. 1967); Swift & Co. v. Solien, 274 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Mo. 1967).
54. For example, in NLRB v. British Auto Parts, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 368 (C.D. Cal.
1967), the court stated at 372:
The tenn "evidence" is not limited to formal proof of disputed facts presented in
a trial-type hearing. Rather, Section 11(1) permits the Board to subpena records
containing information necessary or helpful to carrying out its statutory duties at
the investigative, as well as at the hearing stage of its proceedings. Cudahy Packing
Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 692, 693 (10th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Northern Trust Co., 56
F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Ill. 1944), afj'd, 148 F.2d 24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 731
••• (1945).
55. An investigation of the two cases cited by the court in NLRB v. British Auto
Parts, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 368 (C.D. Cal. 1967), points out the fact that the material
subpoenaed was evidence in the traditional sense. In determining whether the
NLRB had jurisdiction in NLRB v. Northern Trust Co., 56 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Ill.
1944), afj'd, 148 F.2d 24 (7th Cir.), cert. -denied, .326 U.S. 731 (1945), the subpoenaed
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the broad definition of evidence seems desirable in this context, and
the departure from precedent may be justifiable in light of the
novelty of the situation facing the courts in Excelsior list cases.
However, assuming that the broader definition of evidence is
acceptable, the use of the lists once they have been subpoenaed may
well preclude resort to the subpoena approach. Employers have
regularly contested enforcement of Excelsior list subpoenas by arguing that the NLRB is not empowered to obtain. material solely for
use by a union, but the courts have rejected this defense until quite
recently. Courts rejecting this defense have generally relied upon
NLRB v. Friedman/' 6 where the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit permitted the NLRB to accept assistance from union economists
in analyzing records subpoenaed from an employer in the prosecution of an unfair labor practice charge. However, this case is readily
distinguishable from the Excelsior situation in that the material was
not subpoenaed for the sole purpose of making it available to the
union; indeed, union access to the material was allowed only as an
incident to the NLRB's use of the information.
The court in Q-T Shoe recognized this distinction in refusing to
enforce the NLRB's Excelsior list subpoena and stated that:
information was used to establish the disputed fact that the employer's operations
affected interstate commerce within the meaning of the NLRA. Cudahy Packing Co.
v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1941), the employees' names were used by the NLRB
only to determine which employees were eligible to vote, a fact which the NLRB
clearly had power to investigate. Two other cases frequently cited to support a broad
definition of evidence also seem inappropriate. NLRB v. New England Transp. Co.,
14 F. Supp. 497 (D. Conn. 1936) (payroll data used to determine the disputed fact of
whether the employees belonged in a bargaining unit); NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 357
U.S. l (1958) (subpoenaed documents used to determine disputed issue of whether
the employer's business affected interstate commerce for purposes of establishing
jurisdiction).
It may be that the courts are engaging in the time-honored practice of finding an
administrative agency's subpoena power "ambiguous" in order to allow an "interpretation" which will produce a desirable result; see Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations:
Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60 MICH. L. REv. 187, 188-89 (1961).
However, only one case has openly taken this approach. In NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d
52 (7th Cir. 1967), the court seemed to realize that the authority cited by other courts
did not apply and that the only method through which an expanded definition of
"evidence" could be obtained was through a proper "interpretation" of the language of
the NLRA. Thus, the court in Rohlen reasoned that in construing the NLRB's power
to issue subpoenas "to produce evidence ..• or .•. give testimony touching the matter
under investigation or in question,'' primary emphasis should be placed on the phrase
"under investigation." Since the traditional purpose of an "investigation" is to gather
all of the relevant facts and information, restricting the kind of material which can
be subpoenaed to "evidence" in the traditional sense would be equivalent to reading
the phrase "under investigation" out of the NLRA. Consequently, the court concluded that whether the material subpoenaed was within the normal definition of
"evidence" was irrelevant as long as it "touched a matter under investigation.'' Id. at
57. However, in arriving at this "interpretation,'' the Rohlen court seems to read the
limiting term "evidence" out of the statute.
56. 352 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1965).

1306

Michigan Law Review

Nowhere do Sections (11)(1) and (11)(2) of the Act authorize the
Board to use its investigatory and subpoena powers for the sole purpose of transmitting information to certain parties to a representation
proceeding, as required by the Excelsior rule. The plain language of
Section 11(1) of the Act would appear to indicate that there must be
some independent use made by the Board itself of evidence obtained
pursuant to its investigatory powers under that section.57
An "independent use" requirement, if followed by other courts,
would probably preclude use of the subpoena power to enforce the
Excelsior rule, whatever definition of "evidence" is established.
Thus, it is apparent that neither of the theories which the NLRB
has advanced provides a completely satisfactory rationale for judicial
enforcement of the Excelsior rule. Of course, the underlying difficulty is the failure of Congress to provide the NLRB with appropriate sanctions to insure compliance with the election rules which
the NLRB feels are necessary to determine accurately the important
question of whether a particular union should be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent for a group of employees. This deficiency
is curious in light of the clear congressional purpose to make the
initial certification of unions the exclusive province of the NLRB58
and to have certification questions determined quickly. 59 The problems considered in this Note suggest that a statutory scheme providing for a summary proceeding in which the NLRB could obtain
prompt judicial enforcement of its election rules would be desirable.
Presumably, the availability of such a device would increase voluntary compliance by the parties with rules like the Excelsior rule.
However, until Congress takes the necessary steps to remedy the
general problems in this area, it is apparent that many courts will
strain-as several courts already have in enforcing subpoenas under
the NLRB's second theory-to assist the NLRB in enforcing the
Excelsior rule.
57. NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 67 L.R.R.M. 2356, 2360 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 1968)
(emphasis added).
58. See note 2 supra.
59. See authorities cited note 30 supra.

